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Abstract 
Uncertainty may be taken to characterize in­
ferences, their conclusions, their premises or 
all three. Under some treatments of uncer­
tainty, the inference itself is never character­
ized by uncertainty. We explore both the sig­
nificance of uncertainty in the premises and 
in the conclusion of an argument that in­
volves uncertainty. We argue that for un­
certainty to characterize the conclusion of an 
inference is natural, but that there is an in­
terplay between uncertainty in the premises 
and uncertainty in the procedure of argu­
ment itself. We show that it is possible in 
principle to incorporate all uncertainty in the 
premises, rendering uncertainty arguments 
deductively valid. But we then argue (1) 
that this does not reflect human argument, 
(2) that it is computationally costly, and (3) 
that the gain in simplicity obtained by allow­
ing uncertainty in inference can sometimes 
outweigh the loss of flexibility it entails. 
1 BEING UNCERTAIN AND 
BEING ABOUT UNCERTAINTY 
There are many ways of expressing our uncertainty. 
In what follows, I shall try to ensure that nothing 
I say depends crucially on whether we express un­
certainty by means of belief functions !Shafer, 1976; 
Smets and Kennes, 1994], or probability functions, or 
classes of probability functions [Levi, 1967; Levi, 1980], 
or probability envelopes [Walley, 1991], or by fuzzi­
ness [Zadeh, 1975], or by possibility measures [Dubois 
and Prade, 1985] , or any other way. However we 
construe uncertainty, though, we shall want to make 
a distinction between a sentence expressing that un­
certainty, and the sentence whose uncertainty may be 
being expressed. 
Example 1: "The probability of heads on a toss of a 
coin is 0.5 ± L" Barring the possibly question-begging 
occurrences of the indefinite article "a," this is simply a 
factual assertion about the behavior of coins !Reichen­
bach, 1949]. It embodies uncertainty, because one of 
the facts about coins is that the results of their flips are 
uncertain, and in fact uncertain in the way described. 
For most of us there is little or nothing uncertain about 
the statement itself. 
Example !2: "Albert's degree of belief in the occur­
rence of heads on the next toss of this coin is 0.5." 
Again, this is a factual assertion about Albert; pre­
sumably about his willingness to buy and sell chances 
based on the outcome of the toss in question [Savage, 
1954]. There is nothing special about Albert ; we may 
in other contexts use the possessive pronouns "your," 
"our," and "my." A statement like this, in the con­
text of reasoning or decision making, is a statement 
embodying uncertainty - perhaps in a different sense 
from that embodied in the first example. 
Contrast those statements with these: 
Example S: "It is almost certain that the probabil­
ity of heads on the toss of a coin is about a half." 
Several things may be observed. First, there is the 
obvious possibility that the interpretation of "almost 
certain" may be taken from a different representation 
than is given to probability; there is no reason why 
this cannot be interpreted subjectively while probabil­
ity is interpreted in terms of frequencies. Second, the 
role in argument played by the quoted sentence in this 
example is quite different from the role played by the 
sentence in the first example. 
Example 4: "It is very unlikely that Albert's degree of 
belief in the occurrence of heads on the next toss of this 
coin is 0.5" Similar observations may be made in this 
case. "Very unlikely" does not refer to Albert's degree 
of belief; it may be a value in some objective epistemic 
representation of uncertainty, or reflect a parameter in 
a statistical test, or represent the degree of belief of an 
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experimental psychologist. As in the previous exam­
ples, the most important difference between Example 
2 and Example 4 lies in the different roles they play in 
argument. 
In order to say something useful about the roles these 
uses of uncertainty-language play in argument and in­
ference, we must clarify the relation between argument 
and inference, and attempt to understand their role in 
our intellectual (and decision making!) economy. 
2 ARGUMENT AND INFERENCE. 
I am using "infer" as an action word: a person, or 
a machine, infers something from a set of premises 
or "makes an inference." 1 Like inference, reasoning is 
psychological. It is some thing that people do, and I 
see no reason why machines should not also be said 
to do it. I will take "argument," on the other hand, 
to be the formal counterpart of an inference or a piece 
of reasoning. Argument has an important social role 
- it helps us to come to agreement about what is 
the case: A can use an argument to persuade B that 
something is the case. Of course A can use a lot of 
things other than argument - coercion, bribery, ca­
jollery, sweet talk; and even among arguments some 
are better than others. Not all arguments are valid­
A can use argumenti ad hominum, ad populum, ... , 
ad infinitum. 
Clearly, what we are interested in are rational argu­
ments: arguments that are rationally compelling. Or 
which purport to be - I don't want to prejudge the 
possibility of defeasible arguments. I have avoided 
characterizing these arguments as "valid" both for the 
sake of allowing defeasible argumentation to be ratio-. 
nally persuasive, and for the sake of allowing the pos­
sibility of inductively good arguments. 
A way of characterizing arguments that allows all these 
possibilities is as follows: 
An argument as structured in a formal lan­
guage consists of 
1. Premises. 
2. A procedure of inference. 
3. A conclusion 
The premises of a good argument may be uncertain, 
or they may concern uncertainty, or they may involve 
both, or they may not involve uncertainty at all. The 
procedures of inference may be deductive, or induc­
tive, or involve such inferential methods as hypothesis 
11 will forbear to start a new style by saying that a 
person "inferences" a conclusion. 
testing. The conclusion may be of categorical form, or 
may be qualified by a measure of uncertainty or may 
express uncertainty. 
These possibilities can be captured with the help of a 
notation suggested by Hempel [Hempel, 1961]: 
Schema I 
Un certainty-Premise 1 
Premise2 
?(Conclusion)= r 
This represents an argument in which there are two 
premises, one of which expresses uncertainty (proba­
bility, belief, ... ), and in which the conclusion is a 
statement expressing uncertainty explicitly.2 
Example 5: 
The Probability of rain tomorrow is [0.2, 0.3] 
If it rains the ground will be wet 
P(The ground will be wet tomorrow)= [0.2, 1.0] 
Observe that, following Hempel's intention, the argu­
ment here is strictly deductive. However we construe 
uncertainty-whatever semantic underpinning we give 
it-the premises of this inference can be true only if 
the conclusion is true. At least this seems to be so for 
all the alternatives we have considered above. 
The second argument form isolated by Hempel is this: 
Schema II 
Uncertainty-Premise} 
Premise2 
====�==�==�=== P 
Conclusion' 
This represents an argument in which the conclusion 
is categorical, unqualified, but in which the procedure 
of inference is not deductive. It is possible for the 
premises to be true, while the conclusion is false. The 
qualification, p, which occurs next to the double lines, 
is intended to characterize, not the conclusion, but the 
procedure of inference. 3 
Example 6: 
The probability of rain is .95 
If it mins the picnic will be a disaster 
====�==�==�==�========.95 The picnic will be a disaster 
The intended interpretation of this argument struc­
ture is this: the first premise contains knowledge of 
2The letter P which is used to measure the uncertainty 
of the conclusion should not prejudicially be taken as the 
first letter of a possible appropriate measure. 
30.95 represents the minimal cogency of the argument 
in the following example. 
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uncertainty {in the example, the uncertainty that it 
will rain). The second premise contains background 
knowledge regarded as categorical, uncompromised by 
uncertainty, so far as the context of this argument 
goes. This much is parallel to the first form of ar­
gument. But there are two crucial differences. 
F irst, the procedure of inference is no longer assumed 
to be deductive. Inference, on this pattern; is not 
necessarily truth preserving. It could be inductive 
inference, what I have called 'probabilistic inference' 
in other places [Kyburg, 1988], statistical inference 
in the classical form developed by Neyman and Pear­
son [Lehman, 1959j, and perhaps various other forms 
of inference such as inference by analogy. Recall that 
the "procedure of inference" may involve many steps; 
all that is intended by this model is that at least some 
of the steps may not be truth preserving. 
Second, the conclusion of the inference is no longer 
a statement of uncertainty concerning another state­
ment, but is simply that statement itself. It is a cat­
egorical conclusion. In the example, the conclusion 
is not that the picnic will probably be a disaster, but 
that it categorically will be a disaster. This is not to 
say that the inference is incorrigible. Further evidence 
(for example a more recent weather report), added to 
the premises we have taken into account, could lead to 
the opposite conclusion, or could undermine the de­
gree of warrant we have for the conclusion. But that 
is another matter, concerning another argument. By 
regarding the conclusion as categorical, we are just 
saying that in the present context, with the present 
evidence, we are not taking any alternative seriously. 
We are not willing to gamble against the conclusion. 
3 THE INFERENCEPROCEDURE 
In both schemata we have allowed both 'certain' and 
'uncertain' premises. Let us first observe that this is 
perfectly general. There is no problem in taking all the 
categorical or unqualified premises of an argument and 
representing them by a single conjunction. Combining 
the premises concerning uncertainty is another kettle 
of fish. Such a premise can always be thought of as 
providing a distribution-perhaps so simple as a two 
point distribution representing the probability of a sin­
gle statement, or perhaps so complex as a many dimen­
sional joint distribution of several continuously varying 
quantities. Each of these premises can be regarded as 
giving the marginal distribution of one or several ran­
dom quantities. To combine the premises concerning 
uncertainty, then, is to replace these marginal distri­
butions (or sets of marginal distributions, or, ... ) by 
a single joint distribution. 
There are a number of ways of doing this, depending on 
the uncertainty representation with which we start. If 
we represent uncertainty by a single probability distri­
bution, then we must introduce principles- for exam­
ple, indifference, or maximum entropy-that will allow 
us to arrive at a single distribution. These principles 
then become part of what we are taking as premises for 
the inference. If we represent uncertainty by a set of 
probability distributions, or by upper and lower prob­
abilities, then we can take the marginal distributions 
as imposing constraints on the joint distribution; we 
can do this without making substantive assumptions.4 
In any event, what we come to is that the uncertainties 
that are germane to the argument can be captured in 
a single statement of uncertainty-what we have rep­
resented as "Uncertainty-Premise.'' 
Argument schema I may now be taken to have this 
form: there is a single premise expressing our knowl­
edge of uncertainty. In the Bayesian ideal form, it con­
sists of a probability measure over possible worlds, in 
belief function form it consists of a belief function de­
fined on a frame of discernment, under other represen­
tations of uncertainty, it may have other forms. The 
second premise consists of a conjunction of categorical, 
unqualified, evidential, statements. Our conclusion is, 
in Hempel's terms, a statement of probability. But 
just as we generalized the idea of a premise of uncer­
tainty, so we can generalize the conclusion in the same 
way we generalized the premise of uncertainty, and we 
can take the conclusion to be an uncertainty distri­
bution (or any of the specific uncertainty statements 
derivable therefrom). 
This said, the procedure of inference leaps out at us. 
In the probabilistic framework, the procedure is noth­
ing less than classical conditionalization.5 For belief 
functions it may be "Dempster conditioning" [Shafer, 
1976j. For other representations of probability, the 
procedure may be different again. The point is that 
each representation of uncertainty has its own "updat­
ing'' procedures. 
We now claim that the procedure of inference in this 
case is classical deductive inference, and that the ar­
guments that are valid are valid in the classical sense 
that their conclusions are true in every model in which 
the premises are true. In short, we claim that there is 
nothing "uncertain" about the inferences represented 
in an argument fitting the first schema. 
Consider the probability case. We begin with a dis-
4It some times suggested argued that the the premises 
can be characterized as "assumptions" thereby avoiding 
responsibility for their truth or correctness or suitability. 
We will not take this assumption seriously. 
5With a little artificiality it is easy to get the effect of 
"Jeffrey conditionalization" in the classical framework [Ky­
burg, 1986]. 
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tribution of uncertainty, Premise1, and a premise 
consisting of a conjunction of categorical state­
ments, Premise2. We derive ?(Conclusion) = r 
by conditionalizing our initial Uncertainty-Premise, 
Premise1, on Premise2. 
Example 7: We are conducting a compound experi­
ment: drawing an urn from a population of two types 
of urns, and drawing a single ball from the urn se­
lected, and noting whether it is black or white. Our 
knowledge of uncertainty is represented by a joint dis­
tribution according to which the fraction of urns of 
type I is 0.6, and the chance of a black ball from an 
urn of type I is 0.9, and the chance of a black ball from 
an urn of type II is 0.2. (Equivalently: we select a pa­
tient from a pool of patients, of whom 60% carry virus 
v; we perform a test which gives a positive reaction 
90% of the time in carriers, and only 20% of the time 
in non-carriers.) We add as a premise that ball a, the 
ball we have drawn, is black. (The test has given a 
positive reaction.) We conclude that the probability is 
0.87 that the urn we have tested is of type I (that the 
patient is a carrier). 
type[ 
black 0.90 
white 0.10 
type II 
0.20 
0.80 
This matrix represents the chance that the ball we 
have chosen, a, is black according to the two kinds of 
urns from which we might have selected it. 
This is combined with the knowledge that the chance 
of getting type I is 0.60 and the chance of getting type 
II is 0.40, i.e., that the probability that the selected 
urn u is of type I is 0.60 and that it is of type II is 
0.40. 
These two facts represent our knowledge of uncer­
tainty. 
Our categorical knowledge is represented by the state­
ment that we have selected urn u, and that the ball 
we have drawn from urn u, ball a, is black. 
Our conclusion (that the probability is 0.87 that the 
urn we have tested is of type I) is formally derivable 
from these two premises: we may formally deduce the 
sentence 
P(Urn u is of type II ball a is bla.ck) = 0 .87 
from the two premises. 
There is a minor bit of legerdemain here; namely, one 
would ordinarily construe the table as representing a 
general bit of statistical knowledge, and we need to be 
careful in applying it to the specific ball a. Similarly, 
we are applying our general knowledge about the fre­
quency of urns of the two kinds to u. But this is just 
the question of determining "the reference class" for 
the application of statistical knowledge; some of us do 
regard that as a serious problem, but it is not one I 
want to address here [Kyburg, 1983]. 
The example illustrates a fairly uncontroversial and 
simple bit of Bayesian inference. We examined it in 
some detail because we wanted to be very clear that 
the inference involved is pure, mathematical, deduc­
tive, truth-preserving inference. 
W hile other forms of uncertainty representation and 
updating will employ different bits of mathematics, the 
general principle is the same. The measure of uncer­
tainty employed will be defined in such a way as to 
make use of certain logical and mathematical machin­
ery, and the application of that machinery in a specific 
case will be no more than the application of deductive 
procedures to that specific case. 
4 WHAT ARE ARGUMENTS FOR? 
Arguments no doubt serve a lot of functions, but one 
is to aid in decision making. For this purpose, argu­
ments conforming to the first schema are exactly what 
we need. We need to assess the uncertainty of the var­
ious consequences of various actions in order to com­
pute the expected utility of each act open to us. In the 
simplest case, the argument results in a number that 
can be construed as a probability. These probabili­
ties are the probabilities that, combined with utilities, 
yield expectations. If we agree on utilities and agree on 
the evidence, we should agree on acceptable actions. 
Another function of argument is to establish those 
statements we take as premises in arguments. For 
this function, the second schema seems right. We of­
ten want to accept a statement categorically, without 
hedging. This is most clear with respect to statements 
that are close to reports of experience---€xactly those 
statements that, under the first schema, we would be 
disposed to conditionalize on. 
Example 8: Suppose we have to decide whether or not 
to hold a picnic tomorrow. You and I agree, at least 
roughly, on the relative utilities of holding a picnic if 
it rains, calling the picnic off if it rains, holding the 
picnic if it doesn't rain, and calling the picnic off if it 
doesn't rain. One of the factors involved in assessing 
the chance of rain is the barometric pressure. We have 
accepted a general statistical theory of the weather (let 
us assume), and applied all the knowledge we have 
to arrive at a probability of rain conditional on the 
barometric pressure. To obtain an updated probability 
of rain, all we have to do is plug in the barometric 
pressure. But the theory we have does not give the 
probability of rain conditional on our having read a 
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certain number; it gives that conditional probability 
in terms of the actual pressure. The actual pressure is 
what we need to plug in; but we can only obtain it by 
means of inference from the "reading." We must uses 
schema I I  to infer a premise we need for schema I. 
There thus appears to be a need for both types of 
conclusion and thus both types of inference. 6 
5 ARE UNQUALIFIED 
CONCLUSIONS NECESSARY? 
A natural question to ask is whether there is really a 
need for both types of inference, or whether the ap­
parent need is illusory. There is a sense in which we 
might say that the need is illusory. Suppose that one 
item, say P, in the categorical premise Pz needed for 
an inference of the first sort is justified by means of an 
argument fitting the second schema. As our gloss on 
the first schema showed, in a probability framework, 
we may represent the probability of the conclusion as 
the conditional probability of the conclusion given the 
categorical evidence Pz. 
As our gloss on the second schema showed, this means 
that, according to the uncertainty distribution called 
upon by that argument, the uncertainty of P, updated 
by P2, is less than 1 - p (where p is our acceptance 
level). 
Let us suppose that the uncertainty premises of both 
inferences are consistent with each other, and can jus­
tifiably be combined. (This requires a lot more than 
bare consistency.) We can now construct a schema 
of the first form that does not require the categorical 
premise Pz. 
The argument has as premises the combination 
C( P1, P{ of the uncertainty premises of the two old 
arguments. As a categorical premise it uses the old 
categorical premise with the component P deleted, but 
with P2 from the second argument added. The uncer­
tainty of the conclusion is modified to take account of 
the uncertainty of P. We compute: 
?(Conclusion) = 
?((Conclusion A P) V (Conclusion A -.P))JPzA P2) = 
6 Attempts have been made [Levi, 1967; Levi, 1980] to 
unify these two functions. The idea is that we should re­
gard the acceptance of a statement as an ac t that, like any 
other, has consequ ences that depend on the actual state of 
the world. The general idea goes back to Dewey [Dewey, 
1938], and perhaps earlier. One difficulty with this idea is 
that it is hard to know what the long-run consequences of 
accepting a statement may be, when it is a statement that 
itself fu nctions as a premise in an argument whose function 
is to take account of the more immediate consequences of 
particular actions. 
?((Conclus ion A P)JPz A P2)+ 
?((Conclusion A -.P)JPz A P2) = 
P(PJPz A P2)P(ConclusionJP A Pz A P2)+ 
P(-.PJP2 A P2)P(ConclusionJ-.P A Pz A P2) 
Since P(PJPremisez) is high and P(-.PJPremise2) 
is low, this sum will be close to the old value, 
P( Conclusion\P A Pz) 
Example 9: To calculate the likelihood of rain, we con­
ditionalized on the barometer reading, even though we 
knew that the barometer was not a perfect measuring 
instrument. If we are challenged on the basis of the 
fact that our barometric observation merely confers 
probability on our conclusion that the pressure has a 
certain value, we may note that (1) we can combine 
the uncertainty knowledge we have about the barome­
ter with that concerning the general conditions of the 
picnic, (2) we may combine the barometer observation 
with the other categorical statements relative to which 
we are calculating the desirability of holding a picnic, 
and {3) we may compute the conditional probability of 
the picnic being a disaster relative to this new collec­
tion of evidence. We note that it is close to the original 
conditional probability. 
Under what conditions will such a procedure work? 
We have demonstrated it for probability as the mea­
sure of uncertainty, but even in that case there are 
some conditions that must be satisfied. As we men­
tioned, not only must Premise1 be consistent with 
Premise't, but it must be reasonable to adopt a joint 
distribution embodying both of them. In any situation 
in which an argument of schema II may be used to jus­
tify the use of a premise P in an argument of schema 
I, it is not hard to see how this condition could be met, 
in terms of any representation of uncertainty, provided 
the original inferences were satisfactory. 
The second condition is more problematic. In our dis­
cussion we depended on the fact that probability is ad­
ditive, and that if the probability of Pis "high", then 
the probability of ---,pis "low". Again, however, when 
"high" is construed as allowing for unqualified detach­
ment of a conclusion from the premises that make it 
relatively certain, it is hard to see how this condition 
could fail to be met either. In terms of belief functions, 
for example, a "high" Bel value for P must be associ­
ated with a "low" Bel value for -.P, and Bel applied 
to an exclusive disjunction must have at least as high a 
value as the sum of its values for the disjuncts [Shafer, 
1976]. Similarly, possibility theory [Dubois and Prade, 
1985] seems to satisfy this condition, as does the trans­
ferable belief model [Smets and Kennes, 1994]. 
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6 THE ELIMINABILITY OF 
SCHEM A II 
Since the use of schemata of the second form to gener­
ate categorical premises for schemata of the first form 
is, subject to the two conditions mentioned above, 
eliminable in the case of any particular categorical 
premise, we may ask whether it is eliminable in the 
case of the collection of categorical premises i� schema 
I. Here an interesting possible problem arises. Let us 
suppose that the premises whose justification is sought 
via schemata of the second kind are ?21, ... , P21c· 
W hat we need for updating the uncertainty distribu­
tion of the first argument is, in effect, the conjunction 
of P21 • . . .  , P21c· In the context of schema I, where these 
are regarded as incorrigible and unqualified, there is no 
problem: we can conjoin certainties ad libitum. But 
when we reject these premises as certainties, and seek 
to incorporate the evidence for them into schema I, 
we must worry anew about lottery problems [Kyburg, 
1961], just as we must in schema II when what we 
are looking for is an argument for the conjunction in 
question. 
Example 10: We are considering inviting John to join 
our Frisbee team. Practise isn't important, but native 
athletic ability is. Our ignorance premise says that 
almost anyone who is under six feet tall and weighs 
more than 250 pounds is unathletic (-.A). Our cate­
gorical premises say that John is under six feet tall, 
and weighs more than 250 pounds. Let us represent 
additional categorical premises by E. We conclude 
that the expected value of inviting him to join our 
team is less than the expected value of not inviting 
him to join our team. 
But our categorical premises are not "certain" -they 
are supported by arguments of type II. Let the cat­
egorical premises of these arguments (which presum­
ably include scale readings and stadiometer readings) 
be F, and suppose that they each support their con­
clusion (respectively, "John's weight is more than 200 
pounds" and "John's height is less than six feet") just 
well enough to justify its use in a schema of type I. 
Eliminating the use of schema II leads to the replace­
ment of 
P(--.A(J)IE 1\ W(J) > 2501\ H(J) < 6), 
which was high, by its development in terms of 
W(J) > 250 and H(J) < 6, conditioned on both E 
and F. The result consists of four terms, the first of 
which contains the factor 
P(H(J) > 250 A H(J) < 6IE A F) 
and the remaining three contain, respectively, the fac-
tors 
P( --.A(J)!--.W(J) > 2501\ H(J) < 61\ E 1\ F) 
P(--.A(J)IW(J) > 250A--.H(J) <61\EI\F) 
P(--,A(J)!--.W(J) > 2501\ --.H(J) < 61\ E 1\ F). 
The last three factors could quite easily be low (lots 
of short people are athletic, lots of heavy people are 
athletic, and lots of people who are neither short nor 
heavy are athletic. Each of the four terms of the sum 
contains a factor that may be well below one, and their 
sum may well be less than degree to which schema II 
supports ....,A( J) 
W hat we learn from this example might well be the 
advisability of eschewing schema II entirely. We can­
not always replace its use in the way in which we have 
outlined, but the reason is exactly that its use is not 
always warranted. When it is not warranted is exactly 
when a number of arguments conforming to schema 
II are used to provide justification for the categor­
ical premises of an application of schema I that re­
quires conditioning on these premises simultaneously: 
To have good enough reasons for A and for B is not 
to have good enough reasons for A 1\ B. This is the 
lottery "paradox." 
Carnap [Carnap, 1968], discussing the possibility of 
inductive logic using arguments conforming to schema 
II, argues that while people do seem to discuss argu­
ments in the way suggested, it is to be understood as 
an abbreviation or shorthand for a more adequate view 
of induction, which should proceed strictly according 
to schema I I. For Carnap there is no place for argu­
ments conforming to schema II.  This seems to be true 
of Cheeseman, as well [Cheeseman, 1988]. 
Nevertheless, there are some arguments in favor of 
schema II playing a role in uncertain inference. 
7 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF 
SCHEM A II 
First, as many writers agree, if the use of schema II is 
only a shorthand approximation for the use of schema 
II,  it is nevertheless an approximation that is useful 
and convenient. We may want to be careful about its 
use, but that is not grounds for eschewing it altogether. 
Second, the fact that people do accept highly sup­
ported conclusions, rather than merely according them 
their appropriate degree of uncertainty, should not be 
dismissed lightly. I would be the last person to sug­
gest that this reflects an intention on the part of the 
Grand Engineer, but it is certainly the case that our 
characteristics, including our epistemic characteristics, 
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have been honed over many millenia. Much of what 
we do-not all, of course--works. 
Third, consider what is involved in eschewing schema 
II. It is hard to know exactly what can go into 
premise2 of that schema, but whatever it is, it must 
have the following characteristics: It must be consis­
tent in the very strong sense that no conjunction of 
parts of Premise2 can be unacceptable. It must be 
monotonic, in the sense that no amount of contrary 
evidence can led us to withdraw or modify any part of 
Premise2. An extreme suggestion is to take percep­
tual judgments to fall in this category, but this can't be 
right: any judgment, including a perceptual judgment, 
can be wrong. Even these would not be monotonic in 
the required sense. It seems much more natural and 
reasonable to include as data judgments that we rea­
sonably regard, not as incorrigible, but as practically 
certain. But of course these judgments are nonmono­
tonic. It is not clear that any statement having content 
can be regarded as incorrigible. 
Fourth, if we are to include the evidential data sup­
porting the wide class of propositions we need to take 
account of in our day to day lives, the sheer mass of 
the data could be overwhelming. Imagine how exten­
sive the data would be for even quite straight forward 
arguments, and how complex the full arguments must 
be. For example consider the problem of reconstruct­
ing an engineering argument in terms of "perceptions" 
rather than in terms of quantities! 
Example 11: Consider an argument of type I that in­
volves conditioning on k pieces of d ata, each of which 
is acceptable in terms of an argument fitting schema 
II, but none of which is incorrigible. Not only would 
we have to accommodate in Premise2 all of the under­
lying immediate data that support each of the k pieces 
of data, but measure of the conclusion will (if proba­
bility is a guide) consist of the sum of 2k terms, each 
of which involves a complex operation of updating. 
Fifth, we have so far attended only to the premises we 
have taken to be categorical. But in arguments of both 
kinds we need premises embodying our knowledge 
about uncertainty. According to some views, these 
premises neither have nor need justification: they are 
taken to represent the opinions of the agent. But if 
the "agent" is more than one person, and the persons 
involved do not agree on a prior distribution of prob­
ability, argument schema I, as a pattern that can be 
used for coming to agreement, breaks down. 
According to other views, these premises represent the 
application of a principle such as a principle of indif­
ference [Laplace, 1951] or a principle of maximizing 
entropy over a set of answers [Jaynes, 1957]. The jus­
tification for the premises is provided by these princi-
pies. While the former view seems too liberal to ensure 
agreement among cooperating agents, the latter seems 
too dictatorial. 
There is a middle ground, of course, which is often 
encountered in the real world. This accepts the idea 
that knowledge of uncertainty is knowledge that has 
been earned by hard scientific inquiry, based on data 
that are objective and public. But if the uncertainty 
premises are taken to be accepted in argurnents fitting 
schema I, their justification, since it is for their cat­
egorical acceptance, must be taken as conforming to 
schema I I. 
Several forms of nonmonotonic logic have been pro­
posed; these may be construed as governing inferences 
conforming to schema II, though generally lacking in 
an uncertainty premise. Nevertheless, though leaving 
much about which agreement is needed irnplicit, they 
do yield categorical, non-qualified conclusions, which 
are uncertain in the specific sense that they may be 
withdrawn in the light of new evidence. 
An attempt to provide a general semantics for infer­
ences conforming to schema II has been made in [Ky­
burg, 1 996]. Specifically statistical inferences have 
been explored in [Kyburg, 1974]: what is sought there 
is exactly that middle ground referred to above, in 
which our knowledge about uncertainty is, like other 
knowledge, based on objective and public data, and 
methods of inference that may be characterized either 
as yielding the truth frequently or as succumbing to 
error rarely. 
8 CONCLUSION 
Taking Hempel's paradigms to provide alternative 
frameworks for "uncertain" inference, we have seen 
that in principle it is possible to incorporate the un­
certainty in the uncertainty premise of the inference, 
and that the uncertainty characterizing the conclusion 
is then given explicitly. This has the advantage of 
robustness, but the disadvantage of complexity. The 
inference itself, in such a schema, is not uncertain, but 
deductively valid. The (probabilistic) conclusion holds 
in every model in which the premises hold. 
One disadvantage of such a schema is that it leads to 
a high degree of complexity in uncertain inference. It 
also fails to reflect the habits of human argumentation, 
which often employ schemata of type II to establish the 
premises needed for arguments falling under the first 
schema. 
Schemata of type II have the disadvantage that they 
cannot be freely combined, since the justifications of 
two statements do not necessarily provide a justifica­
tion for their conjunction. Further, the inferential pro-
372 Kyburg, Jr. 
cedures they employ are not valid: there can be models 
of the premises in which the conclusion is false. 
Uncertain inferences with categorical conclusions ap­
pear to be what have inspired those who work with 
nonmonotonic logic. They correspond to certain 
classes of classical statistical inference-confidence in­
tervals, hypothesis testing [Lehman, 1959] . How to 
deal with the non-conjunctive character of such infer­
ences is a problem that is under investigation in a num­
ber of areas, but it is one for which no general agreed­
upon solution exists. Our considerations suggest that 
this is a worthy area to explore. 
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